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Abstract—Decentralized systems, such as distributed ledgers
and the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), are designed to
offer more open and robust services. However, they also create
opportunities for illegal activities. We demonstrate how these
technologies can be used to launch a ransomware as a service
campaign. We show that criminals can transact with affiliates
and victims without having to reveal their identity. Furthermore,
by exploiting the robustness and resilience to churn of IPFS, as
well as the decentralized computing capabilities of Ethereum,
criminals can remain offline during most procedures, with many
privacy guarantees.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Distributed Ledger Technologies,
Ethereum, InterPlanetary File System
I. INTRODUCTION
Ransomware has been a serious problem for Internet users
and recently mostly for businesses. Ransomware is malicious
software that blocks users from accessing their data (usually
by encrypting them) and demands a ransom to restore access.
A recent report from Cybersecurity Ventures predicts that there
will be a ransomware attack every 11 seconds by 2021.1
Ransomware authors usually take advantage of technolo-
gies designed to provide a more open and free Internet.
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that they were one of
the earliest adopters of blockchain technology. Initially, they
used cryptocurrencies to collect the ransom from their victims
with high anonymity. However, recent findings show that
malware writers leverage blockchain technology as a storage
service, or even as a communication channel between them
and the ransomware [1]. Nevertheless, distributing files over a
blockchain can be cumbersome and some times expensive as
blockchains are not ideal for storing arbitrary data.
The InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) is a more attractive
alternative for distributing ransomware files. IPFS is a peer-
to-peer network that acts as a distributed file system. Being
anonymous and robust, IPFS is an attractive platform for
malicious activities. Indeed, in May 2019, Anomali Labs
reported the first malware in the wild that used IPFS to hide its
command-and-control (C2) communication [2]. Files stored in
IPFS can be easily accessed using HTTPS. Furthermore, files
1https://cybersecurityventures.com/global-ransomware-damage-costs-
predicted-to-reach-20-billion-usd-by-2021/
are robustly cached by IPFS nodes; therefore, they can be
retrieved even if the original storage node is offline.
Currently, cybercrime is a global underground economy
with various monetization venues. It is estimated that only
in 2018, the revenue of cybercrime was more than $1.5
billion [3]. Practically, we are facing a huge threat that is
gradually becoming more organised. Malicious campaigns
can be considered more in the scope of enterprises, than
of individuals or groups. In fact, as noted multiple times in
underground forums, many modern campaigns and attacks
are a result of a “service.” For instance, we have already
witnessed the evolution of creating botnets to perform denial
of service attacks, to providing the “botnet-as-a-service,” i.e.,
renting compromised hosts to others to perform their attacks.
More generally, the case of Malware-as-a-Service is a well-
established model, however, as we discuss below, it is still in
its infancy. Practically, malware authors “advertise” in forums,
mostly in the dark Web, or channels of secure messengers,
their skills to develop malware with specific capabilities for a
price and usually are paid in a cryptocurrency.
We argue that while the model works, we expect it to
shift to more enterprise status. The shift is expected since it
is known that Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) and other
organizations try to monitor or even backdoor forums and, as
a result, reveal the identity of malware authors. We believe
that the key future venue would be further exploitation of
decentralized models. Hence, a model where the various func-
tionalities are split, operate individually, and are orchestrated
through a blockchain is a viable alternative that we will face
more in the near future. The research question is therefore to
predict this trend and identify weaknesses and gaps to be used
to counter such threats.
In this paper, we realize the concept of Ransomware as a
Service (RaaS). RaaS is, in essence, a “ransomware affiliation
program”: affiliates spread ransomware to potential victims
who, upon infection, pay an amount to the ransomware author
in exchange for a (file) decryption key; the affiliate who
performed the infection receives a percentage of the ransom
and the remainder is received by the RaaS system owner.
In the considered system, we fully utilize blockchain
and IPFS technologies. We take advantage of the Ethereum
blockchain by using smart contracts as a registration and ran-
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transactions. We also leverage IPFS to reliably host Web pages
used for interacting with Ethereum smart contracts, as well
as the malicious executable files. This system achieves the
following: (1) The amount of time a ransomware author needs
to be online is minimal. (2) The ransomware author does not
have to have a stable network address. (3) The identities of the
ransomware authors and the affiliates are hidden. (4) Affiliates
do not have to pay money upfront; instead, malware authors
receive a commission from the ransom. (5) Once up and
running, it is too hard to take offline the RaaS system, as
well as the registration and payment systems.
While our research investigates the potential issues of an
extension of the current ransomware schemes, we have not
detailed important technical aspects that could allow a per-
petrator to release the proposed scheme in the wild. This is
aligned with the ethical boundaries set for offensive security
research that enable the assessment of a threat, yet prevents
its use in the wild before prompt awareness and deployment
of precaution measures.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In
Section II, we present related work in the area. In Section III,
we introduce our blockchain-based architecture and in Section
IV, we present its implementation. We evaluate our system in
Section V. Finally, in Section VI, we discuss various aspects of
the system and potential mitigation directions and in Section
VII we provide conclusions and an outlook.
II. RELATED WORK
Al-rimy et al. [4] have done a very in-depth review of
the research on typical ransomware. They also propose a
taxonomy from three perspectives: severity, platform, and
target. However, the authors do not take into consideration
the case of ransomware as a service.
Lately, there has been growing interest in blockchain tech-
nologies and the different ways they can be exploited for
threats and crimes. Moubarak et al. [5] studied the blockchain
potential in K-ary malware. A K-ary malware, instead of
holding virus instructions in a single file, consists of K parts
whose union results in the malware. Each one of these parts
individually is a seemingly benign executable. In their paper,
they created a 4-ary malware and used blockchain technology
with Proof of Existence (PoE). PoE is a way for someone
to prove that a file existed at a specific time. PoE exploits
the OP_RETURN opcode [6] to insert into the blockchain
the files hash value [7]. The same opcode is also used in
the work of Ali et al. [8]. The authors leveraged Bitcoin
technology to implement their Proof of Concept (PoC) botnet
named ZombieCoin. Contrary to these works, which use the
blockchain to store the malware, we consider malware storage
on the IPFS. We opted for the use of IPFS for file distribution
since it does not require any specialized software, it has low
communication overhead and it does not involve monetary
cost.
In addition, previous research tries to exploit blockchains
to facilitate the communication between the ransomware and
its author. The goal of these efforts is to prevent network
administrators from applying takedown mechanisms and allow
malware to continue their interactions with its creator. Plet-
inckx et al. [9] proposed a solution that allows ransomware to
coordinate using information stored in the Bitcoin blockchain,
a technique which is actively used by the Cerber ransomware
[10]. Patsakis and Casino [11] proposed an IPFS-based ap-
proach for the same purpose. Our work does not consider any
direct communication between the ransomware and its author;
instead, these entities communicate with each other indirectly
through the deployed smart contracts.
One of the main reasons for the rise of ransomware is the
adoption of cryptocurrencies. This enabled malware authors
to receive the ransom in a seamless and anonymous way,
leaving few if any traces that could lead to their prosecution.
The economic model that is used by ransomware has already
been studied in the literature [12]–[14], trying to identify for
instance whether it is worth paying the ransom or whether
the ransomware could request a higher price. In fact, during
the past few years, we are witnessing less malware, but more
targeted to organisations than individuals, in order to maximise
revenue.
III. SYSTEM DESIGN
We now present the design of the considered architecture
(illustrated in Figure 1). The system is composed of the
following entities: the ransomware author who creates the
original ransomware, some affiliates who buy the ransomware
from an author and try to infect victims. From a high-level
perspective, these entities interact with each other as follows.
Authors store their ransomware in IPFS and make it available
using an Ethereum smart contract. Affiliates obtain it and try
to infect other users. Infected users (i.e., the victims) use
another Ethereum smart contact to pay the ransom and receive
the decryption key. The author and the corresponding affiliate
share the ransom. This functionality is implemented using the
following steps.
A. Setup
During the setup phase, the author creates an Ethereum
account and stores it in a wallet. We will refer to the Ethereum
address of the author as Aaddress. Then, she creates a regis-
tration Web page, a payment Web page, and a ransomware
builder, and uploads them on IPFS. Moreover, she has to
create the corresponding smart contracts and deploy them on
the Ethereum blockchain. In order for the author to upload the
created files in IPFS, she needs an IPFS node running on a
computer under her control, but after the files are received by
other IPFS nodes, her local node is no longer required. The
registration Web page is used by affiliates to join the affiliates
program, whereas the payment page is used by victims to pay
the ransom. Both pages interact with the corresponding smart
contracts and are realized on IPFS for robustness. Finally, the
author sets up a C2 application which interacts with all other
components only through the Ethereum smart contracts. The
C2 application is connected to the Ethereum network and it is
configured to “listen” for specific events.
Ransomware 
Author
Affiliate
IPFS
Registration
Site
Payment
Site
(1) upload registration site, payment site, ransomware builder 
(1) deploy smart contract
(2) register visiting registration site
(3), (10) send transactions
(4), (11) emit events
(5) upload PKsample
(6) find PKsample
(7) download ransomware builder
Victim
(9) enter PKsample and ransoms to payment site 
(12) upload SKsample
(13) find SKsample
(8
) 
b
u
ild
 a
n
d
 s
p
re
ad
 t
h
e 
ra
n
so
m
w
ar
e
Fig. 1. An overview of the considered blockchain-based architecture.
B. Affiliate registration
An affiliate joins the affiliation program through the reg-
istration page. During this process, the affiliate registers his
Ethereum address, which is stored in the corresponding smart
contract, and downloads the builder. For each user he wishes
to infect, the affiliate uses the builder to create a ransomware
sample. Whenever a new sample is created, it uses the reg-
istration smart contract to request a public key PKsample.
This request creates an event which is broadcasted in the
Ethereum network; hence it is received by the C2 application;
the C2 application generates a public-private key pair using
as seed the transaction hash, and returns the public key to
the smart contract. The smart contract verifies that PKsample
was sent by Aaddress. The smart contract stores all PKsample
associated with an affiliate address in a data structure.
C. Victim infection
An affiliate may distribute the ransomware using various
mechanisms, e.g. exploiting a system vulnerability, spear
phishing, etc.; however, the means to do it are beyond the
scope of this work. When the ransomware is executed by a
victim, it creates a symmetric encryption key Keytemp, which
is used to encrypt some critical for the victim files. Then, the
ransomware encrypts Keytemp using PKsample and stores the
ciphertext locally. Finally, the ransomware notice is presented
to the user containing the PKsample, the URL of the payment
page, and the amount of money, in ether, that the victim must
pay to get his files decrypted.
D. Ransom payment
In order for the victim to get his files decrypted, he has
to visit the payment page and enter PKsample, as well as to
deposit the predetermined amount. This amount is transferred
from his Ethereum wallet to the smart contract’s balance,
which in return transfers a proportion of the ransom to the
affiliate and the rest to the ransomware author. This action
emits an event, which is received by the C2 application. The
application retrieves the corresponding secret key SKsample
and sends it to the smart contract. The smart contract verifies
that SKsample was sent by Aaddress. The ransomware uses
SKsample to decrypt Keytemp, and then it uses Keytemp to
decrypt the files of the victim.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
We developed a proof of concept implementation of the
blockchain-based architecture and we deployed it on the
Rinkeby test network. Ethers in the Rinkeby network do not
have any real value. Furthermore, the deployed system does
not contain a true infection mechanism and is thus not directly
usable, i.e., harmless.
The smart contracts of the system were developed using
Solidity. These contracts implement seven functions, corre-
sponding to the actions of the system. The first function is used
for the affiliate registration; it stores the necessary information
in the blockchain, and it emits an event when the process is
completed. Two other functions are used for setting and getting
a PKsample. A fourth function implements ransom payment,
and it is responsible for triggering the corresponding event. A
fifth function is responsible for splitting the ransom between
the affiliate and the author. Finally, there are two functions for
setting and getting SKsample.
As we have already mentioned, the ransomware author is
expected to create the two sites and upload them to IPFS. The
sites are implemented as React applications with a simple user
interface. The sites are interacting with the smart contracts,
using the web3 JavaScript library.
Finally, the implementation of this system includes the C2
application that is executed on behalf of the ransomware
author. This is a script developed in Node.js.
V. EVALUATION
A. Performance and Cost Evaluation
All actions performed in the system involve the invocation
of the smart contract functions discussed in the previous
section. Two of them only read the state of the blockchain;
thus, they have no cost, no significant delay, or serious over-
head. The deployment of the smart contract in the blockchain
network, as well as the cost (measured in gas) for invoking
the contract’s functions, are shown in Table I.
Actor Operation Cost measured in gas
Ransomware Author
Deployment 505822
PKsample Upload 29881
SKsample Upload 22144
Ransom Split 37515
Affiliate Affiliate Registration 22796
Victim Ransom Payment 28326
TABLE I
COST OF THE CONSTRUCTION BUILDING BLOCKS
Three of those five operations are initiated by the ran-
somware author, one by the affiliate, and one by the victim.
Therefore the malware author is billed with a total cost of
TC = 505822+ 29881 · ρ+22144 · δ+37515 · µ gas units,
where ρ is the number of registrations, δ is the number of
SKsample keys generates, and µ is the number of payments
received. At the time of writing, the equivalent of 1 Ether in
fiat currency is $175,59 2 and the gas price is set to 1Gwei.
Assuming that ρ = δ = µ = 100, the total cost for the
ransomware author for 100 registrations and payments will
be ≈ $1, 67 which is minimal by any standard.
In addition to the gas cost, Ethereum also adds an execution
time overhead related to the time a transaction needs to be
mined. This time depends on the gas price, which is the
amount of Ether that a user pays per unit of gas. The higher the
gas price, the faster the transaction will be mined. On average,
an operation in Ethereum is executed in ≈ 13 seconds.
B. Security and Privacy Properties
The system has some intriguing security and privacy prop-
erties. The Ethereum blockchain offers a high degree of
anonymity, as it is hard to track an Ethereum address back to
its real-world owner. Therefore, authors and affiliates cannot
be easily detected. Similarly, once the ransomware and the
Web pages are stored in IPFS, the author does not have to
participate in the IPFS p2p network.
An author does not have to be constantly online; neither has
he to use the same device or network location. An author’s C2
application is triggered by Ethereum events; however, these
events are broadcast on the whole Ethereum network. The
smart contract controls who can write PK/SKsample. This
access control is implemented by examining the Ethereum
address of the entity that made the corresponding transaction;
hence it does not reveal any real-world information.
VI. DISCUSSION
Two key properties of our system are that a) it can easily
bootstrap, and b) it is hard to take it offline.
The system can be easily adopted, since it does not require
any upfront payment by the affiliate, apart from the cost for
2https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/ethereum/
interacting with the blockchain. Instead, affiliates share the
ransom with the ransomware author. Ransom sharing is done
automatically by a smart contract.
IPFS and Ethereum are two robust systems where informa-
tion is permanently stored. Therefore, once the ransomware
and the Web pages are in the IPFS, and the smart contracts are
deployed in Ethereum, they cannot be removed. IPFS provides
a “blacklisting” functionality, which is optional. Similarly,
smart contracts can only be removed using chain “forking”,
which is an extremely unlikely process. On the other hand,
smart contracts cannot be modified; hence they must be
carefully designed so as to be bug-free. The major drawback,
for criminals, of the proposed scheme is the fact that all
the transactions are visible from any participating node of
the blockchain. Therefore, a Law Enforcement Agency can
identify, for instance, when a new affiliate has been recruited, a
payment has been made, etc. Nevertheless, the same applies to
many wallets which have already been identified with criminal
activity. This is the reason for the rise of crypto laundry
services, which can efficiently anonymize such revenues [15].
It is important to mention that field values in smart contracts,
even though they are not declared as public, are still accessible.
A smart contract’s state is visible to anyone using a blockchain
explorer [16]. It is also important to note that even if the smart
contract stores only information about the last registration,
someone can find information about the previous registrations
on the blockchain. But note that every piece of information
sent through the smart contract can be encrypted with the
recipient’s public key so that only he can decrypt it using
his private key, locally.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a system, introducing the idea
of RaaS, leveraging Ethereum smart contracts and IPFS. This
approach leads to enhanced privacy, it automates payments, it
has low cost and low overhead, and it is hard to get it offline.
The system can be extended in many ways. For example, it
can leverage zero-knowledge proofs and anonymous payments
to provide even more effectiveness, privacy and security for
the authors and the affiliates. Additionally, the payment of
smart contracts can be extended to be “more fair,” by exam-
ining the validity of SKsample before making any payments.
Finally, our system can be extended with blockchain-based
ransomware coordination.
The goal of this investigation is not to encourage and
help ransomware authors. It is to motivate researchers in this
area to find solutions for this newly added threat, introduced
by blockchains and IPFS. These technologies are here to
stay; thus, the study of their possible exploitation becomes
a necessity in order to find novel countermeasures.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
We thank Dr. Constantinos Patsakis (Department of Infor-
matics, University of Piraeus) for his helpful comments.
REFERENCES
[1] C. Karam and V. Kamluk, “Blockchainware - decentralized malware on
the blockchain.” 2015, in Black Hat ASIA.
[2] Anomali Labs. The InterPlanetary Storm: New Mal-
ware in Wild Using InterPlanetary File Systems
(IPFS) P2P Network. (2019, June 11). [Online]. Avail-
able: https://www.anomali.com/blog/the-interplanetary-storm-new-
malware-in-wild-using-interplanetary-file-systems-ipfs-p2p-network
[3] M. McGuire, “Into the web of profit: Understanding the growth of the
cybercrime economy,” https://www.bromium.com/wp-content/uploads/
2018/05/Into-the-Web-of-Profit Bromium.pdf, 2018.
[4] B. A. S. Al-rimy, M. A. Maarof, and S. Z. M. Shaid, “Ransomware
threat success factors, taxonomy, and countermeasures: A survey and
research directions,” Computers & Security, vol. 74, pp. 144–166, 2018.
[5] J. Moubarak, E. Filiol, and M. Chamoun, “Developing a K-ary malware
using Blockchain,” arXiv e-prints, Apr. 2018.
[6] S. Nakamoto et al., “Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system,”
2008.
[7] M. Crosby, P. Pattanayak, S. Verma, V. Kalyanaraman et al., “Blockchain
technology: Beyond bitcoin,” Applied Innovation, vol. 2, no. 6-10, p. 71,
2016.
[8] S. T. Ali, P. McCorry, P. H.-J. Lee, and F. Hao, “Zombiecoin 2.0:
managing next-generation botnets using bitcoin,” International Journal
of Information Security, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 411–422, Aug 2018.
[Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-017-0379-8
[9] S. Pletinckx, C. Trap, and C. Doerr, “Malware Coordination using the
Blockchain: An Analysis of the Cerber Ransomware,” in 2018 IEEE
Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS), May 2018,
pp. 1–9.
[10] Avast Academy Team, “Cerber ransomware,” https://www.avast.com/c-
cerber, 2017.
[11] C. Patsakis and F. Casino, “Hydras and IPFS: A Decentralised
Playground for Malware,” International Journal of Information
Security, vol. 18, no. 6, pp. 787–799, December 2019. [Online].
Available: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-019-00443-0
[12] A. Laszka, S. Farhang, and J. Grossklags, “On the economics of ran-
somware,” in International Conference on Decision and Game Theory
for Security. Springer, 2017, pp. 397–417.
[13] N. Caporusso, S. Chea, and R. Abukhaled, “A game-theoretical model
of ransomware,” in International Conference on Applied Human Factors
and Ergonomics. Springer, 2018, pp. 69–78.
[14] E. Cartwright, J. Hernandez Castro, and A. Cartwright, “To pay or not:
game theoretic models of ransomware,” Journal of Cybersecurity, vol. 5,
no. 1, p. tyz009, 2019.
[15] T. de Balthasar and J. Hernandez-Castro, “An analysis of bitcoin
laundry services,” in Secure IT Systems - 22nd Nordic Conference,
NordSec 2017, Tartu, Estonia, November 8-10, 2017, Proceedings,
ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, H. Lipmaa, A. Mitrokotsa,
and R. Matulevicius, Eds., vol. 10674. Springer, 2017, pp. 297–312.
[Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70290-2 18
[16] N. Atzei, M. Bartoletti, and T. Cimoli, “A survey of attacks on ethereum
smart contracts,” Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2016/1007, 2016,
https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1007.
